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Abstract
Data from a major beef packing company (including regulatory compliance costs) are used to
estimate a translog cost function and a system of input demand equations.  Regulatory compliance
costs associated with the zero tolerance directive have increased the cost share of cattle while
reducing the demand for all inputs.Economic Impacts of the Zero Tolerance Directive
on the Cost Structure of Beef Packing Companies
Introduction and Brief History of FSIS Regulations
Increased scrutiny of the safety of the U.S. food supply has followed in the wake of recent
foodborne illness outbreaks (e.g., the 1993 E. coli 0157:H7 outbreak in the Pacific Northwest). 
This increased scrutiny combined with the need to adopt a more science-based approach to meat
inspection has prompted the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) to initiate major changes
in recent years.  Although considerable economic research pertaining to the cost of foodborne
illness to consumers and society (e.g., Marks and Roberts; Roberts, 1991; and Roberts, 1989) and
consumers' willingness-to-pay for safer food (e.g., Hayes et al.; Buzby and Skees; Eom; Huang;
Choi and Jensen; and Zellner and Degner) has been published, little research addressing the
economic impact of food safety regulations on food processors exists.  Given proposed changes in
federal meat inspection regulations, a better understanding of the economic impact of such
regulations on agribusinesses is needed.  This study uses data from a major beef packing firm to
determine the impact of a specific FSIS regulation (i.e., the zero tolerance directive) on the firm's
cost structure.
The current U.S. meat inspection system has changed very little since its inception in the
early 1900's.  Prior to 1996, the method of inspection used by FSIS was based strictly on an
organoleptic (i.e., sight, smell, and feel) approach for detecting unsafe meat.  On March 2, 1993,
in direct response to the outbreak of E. coli 0157:H7 in the Pacific Northwest earlier that year,
FSIS began enforcement of the zero tolerance directive which requires plants to trim all
identifiable feces, ingesta, and milk found on the surface of carcasses before those carcasses are2
washed.  In December of that year, Inspectors-In-Charge were instructed to slow slaughter lines if
the "inspection procedure cannot be adequately performed" (Reed, p.1).  This policy has caused
firms to incur losses not only due to the physical loss of meat trimmings, but also due to slower
line speeds.  On October, 17, 1994, FSIS implemented a program to test for E. coli 0157:H7 in
ground beef.  More recently (July 6, 1996), FSIS released the final ruling on the Pathogen
Reduction, Hazard Analysis, Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems regulation which promises
to be the most significant change in the meat inspection system since its inception.
Model Development
The impacts of the zero tolerance directive are considered by estimating a cost function using data
from a major beef packing company.  The translog functional form, which is commonly used in
production analyses and studies of the meat products industry (e.g., Melton and Huffman; Ball
and Chambers), is used in this study because it is a flexible functional form which places no
restrictions on substitution possibilities among factors of production.  The translog cost function
is represented as:
(1) lnC = ao + SiailnPi + aqlnQ + 1/2SiSjßijlnPilnPj + 1/2ßq(lnQ)
2 +1/2ßr(lnR)
2 +
SißiqlnPilnQ + SißirlnPilnR + ßqrlnQlnR i,j = k,l,c,e,o
where "ln" represents natural logarithms, C is total cost, Pi is the price of input i, Q is total output,
R is a measure of regulatory compliance costs, with k, l, c, e, and o indexing capital, labor, cattle,
energy, and all other inputs, respectively.  For the translog cost function to be consistent with
neoclassical production theory, the following symmetry, homogeneity, and adding-up restrictions
must be imposed:3
(2) ßij=ßji ;  Sjßij=0 for all i ;  Siai=1 ;  Sißij=0 for all j ;  Sißiq=Sißir=0.
Using Shephard's lemma, differentiation of equation (1) yields the following set of input
demand functions:
(3) Si = ai + SjßijlnPj + ßiqlnQ + ßirlnR i,j = k,l,c,e,o
where Si = (Pi*Xi/C) is the cost share of input i, and Xi is the quantity of the i
th input.  Given the
translog function, price elasticities for conditional factor demands are calculated using input cost
shares and the estimated coefficients of the cost function:
(4) Eij = (ßij + SiSj - dijSi) / Si i,j = k,l,c,e,o
where dij is the Kronecker delta.
To obtain a meaningful measure of pairwise input substitution, Blackorby and Russell
recommend using Morishima elasticities of substitution (MES).  For the translog cost function,
Morishima elasticities of substitution are calculated as:
(5) Mij = [(ßji + SjSi)/Sj] - [(ßii + Si 2 - Si)/Si] i,j = k,l,c,e,o.
Economies of scale (EOS) represent the relative increase in output resulting from a proportional
increase in all inputs, and can be written as:
(6) EOS = (aq + ßqlnQ + SißiqlnPi + ßqrlnR)
-1 i = k,l,c,e,o.
The firm's short-run, inverse supply curve is given by its marginal cost function as: 
(7) P = MC = (aq + ßqlnQ + SißiqlnPi + ßqrlnR)*(C/Q) i = k,l,c,e,o.
The own-price elasticity of supply (Es) is approximately equal to the inverse of the own-price
flexibility (Fs):
(8) Es » (Fs)
-1 = {C/(PQ) * [ßq - (dlnC/dlnQ) * (1 - [dlnC/dlnQ])]}
-1.4
To capture the impacts of regulatory compliance costs on the demand for inputs, input
demand elasticities with respect to regulatory compliance costs are calculated as:
(9) Eir = (ß ir/S i) - a r i = k,l,c,e,o.
Data Discussion
Semi-annual data from November 1988 through May 1995 were obtained from the financial
statements of five plants (selected for geographical representation) of a major U.S. beef packing
firm resulting in a panel data set with 70 observations.  Output is measured by the total dressed
weight (pounds, carcass weight) of slaughtered animals.  Expenditures on capital, labor, cattle,
energy, and other inputs are divided by total costs to derive the five input shares used in equation
(3).  Total expenditures on capital are measured by summing expenditures on depreciation, rent,
and total repairs and maintenance.  Expenditures on "all other inputs" are calculated as total cost
of production less expenditures on capital, labor, cattle, and energy. 
Price data are obtained from government sources and from the firm.  Following Goodwin
and Brester, the implicit user cost of capital is used as a proxy for the price of capital and consists
of two components:  the real rate of interest and capital depreciation.  The real rate of interest is
calculated by subtracting the (semi-annual) rate of inflation (measured by semi-annual movements
in the consumer price index) from semi-annualized bond rates.  Consumer price indices are taken
from CPI Detailed Report (U.S. Dept. of Labor).  Bond rates are simple six month averages
(December through May, and June through November) of monthly Baa bond rates reported in the
Survey of Current Business (U.S. Dept. of Commerce) and Moody's Bond Survey.  The
depreciation component of the user cost of capital is calculated by dividing plant depreciation by
net property values (fixed assets less plant depreciation).5
Average hourly earnings for production workers in meat packing plants (SIC 2011),
obtained from Employment and Earnings (U.S. Dept. of Labor), is used as a proxy for the price
of labor.  The firm's average price paid for cattle (on a dressed weight basis) is calculated by
dividing their total cost of live cattle by total dressed slaughter weight.  The producer price index
for fuels, related products, and power, taken from Producer Price Indexes (U.S. Dept. of Labor),
is used for the price of energy.  The price index for "other goods" is backed out of the index of
food marketing costs obtained from Monthly Food Marketing Cost Index Data (U.S. Dept. of
Agriculture) using a Tornquist index suggested by Moschini.
The firm has recorded the amount of downtime caused by complying with the zero
tolerance directive since its enforcement in March 1993.  To capture an objective measure of the
cost of this regulation, average number of minutes of weekly downtime is multiplied by the
number of weeks in each semi-annual period.  The regulatory compliance cost variable equals
zero for all periods prior to 1993.  Thus, this variable represents only those costs incurred as a
direct result of slower line speeds due to the zero tolerance directive and does not reflect loss of
product value due to trimming.
Empirical Results
The total cost equation (equation 1) was estimated jointly with the share equations (equation 3)
for capital, labor, cattle, and energy using iterated seemingly unrelated regressions.  The fifth
input demand equation (all other goods) was not estimated to avoid over-identification. 
However, the parameters were recovered using the parametric restrictions from equation (2). 
Over 80% of the estimated coefficients (as reported in Table 1) are significantly different
Table 1.  Cost Function Parameter Estimates
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a Number of Observations=70; Degrees of Freedom: Cost Function=74, Share Equations=102;
  R-Squared's: System= 0.9999, Cost Function=0.9976, Capital=0.9701, Labor=0.9915,
  Cattle=1.0000, Energy=0.9710.
b Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.  Significance levels indicated by:  "*"=0.10,
  "**"=0.05, "***"=0.01.
from zero at the 10% level.
The generalized R-square measure suggested by Baxter and Cragg was calculated for the
complete system (0.9999).  A raw moment R-square statistic (1 - e¢e/Y¢Y) is reported for each
equation, where e¢e is the sum of the squared errors and Y¢Y is the sum of the squared dependent
variables.  Price elasticities of demand are reported in Table 2.  All inputs have negative own-price7
elasticities of demand, with the exception of the cattle elasticity which is not statistically different
from zero.  The own-price elasticity of capital is relatively inelastic, while the other three
significant own-price elasticities are elastic.  The statistically insignificant elasticity on cattle
probably reflects the importance of cattle as an input in the beef packing industry.  Ward notes
that major beef packing plants strive to operate near capacity.  Thus, packers are likely to be
relatively unresponsive to cattle price changes if they are trying to maintain a certain level of
output.  The signs on the estimated cross-price elasticities indicate that labor is a net substitute
with all other inputs.  Thus, labor is a relatively flexible input in the beef packing industry. 
The Morishima elasticities of substitution (reported in Table 3) are calculated at the means
of the data and indicate that cattle have the least potential for input substitutability.  The highest
substitution possibilities exist for labor, again signifying that labor is the most
flexible input in the beef packing industry.  The MES were also calculated at every data point
(estimates available from the authors).  The MES of most input ratios have either
trended downward or remained relatively constant over the study period.  The exceptions are the
MES associated with cattle, which have all trended upward since the enforcement of the
zero tolerance directive.  These trends reflect the nature of the zero tolerance directive in that,
conditional on output, the firm has had to increase cattle usage to offset the loss of carcass
material caused by trimming.
Using mean values of the price and output variables, economies of scale is calculated as
1.008 with a standard error of 0.002.  Given that this estimate is significantly different from 1,
Table 2.  Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities of Demand.
Percent With Respect to a One Percent Change in the Price of:8
Change in the
Quantity of:
































































a Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors Significance levels: "*"=0 10 "**"=0 05 "***"=0 01
Table 3.  Morishima Elasticities of Substitution.
Quantities
Prices

























































a Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors Significance levels: "**"=0 05 "***"=0 01
Table 4.  Regulatory Compliance Cost Elasticities.
With Respect to a
One Percent
Change in:
Percentage Change in the Quantity of:

















a Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.  Significance levels:  "***"=0.01.
the firm is experiencing slight increasing returns to scale.
The firm has a very elastic, decreasing marginal cost curve, with an elasticity of supply
equal to -158.20.  Large beef packing firms are highly capital intensive and try to operate near full
capacity (Ward).  Thus, these types of firms are likely to be relatively unresponsive to changes in
output price.
Table 1 shows that, except for ßkr, the estimated coefficients on the regulatory compliance
cost variables are statistically significant.  The coefficient on the regulatory compliance cost
variable in the marginal cost equation (ßqr) is positive, indicating that as the cost of compliance
with regulations increase, marginal costs increase.  Cost shares for capital, labor, energy, and all
other goods decrease in response to increases in regulatory compliance costs.  However, the
statistically significant positive coefficient on the compliance cost variable in the cattle demand
equation indicates that the expenditure share of cattle increases in response to increases in
regulatory compliance costs.  This reflects the nature of the zero tolerance directive, which results
in a loss of physical product caused by trimming. 
Estimated regulatory compliance cost elasticities, reported in Table 4, are all negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level.  Thus, although the expenditure share of cattle
increased because of an increase in regulatory compliance costs, the quantity of all inputs
(including cattle) decreased because of the regulatory directive.
Costs to Society
The direct cost of the zero tolerance directive is found by comparing annual firm-level costs per
head for the 1993-95 period to those for the 1988-92 period.  Total firm-level costs per head for
the period that the regulation was in place (1993-95) were calculated using average values of all
variables for the period and the estimated coefficients from equation (1).  Total firm-level costs10
for the 1988-92 period (i.e., prior to the enforcement of the zero tolerance directive) were
calculated using average values of all variables for those years.  The difference between costs in
these two regimes averaged $68.04 per head, or 7.33% of total slaughtering costs.  Multiplying
the per head costs of regulatory compliance by the average number of cattle slaughtered annually
for 1993-95 (USDA, Livestock and Poultry Situation and Outlook) results in an estimate of
annual societal costs from productivity losses of the zero tolerance directive of $2,369 million. 
In addition to productivity losses, reductions in output caused by extra trimming must also
be considered.  Feuz et al. estimated that an average of 7.53 pounds of trim loss per head (or a
product loss of $19.73 per head) was caused by the zero tolerance directive in 1994 and 1995. 
Multiplying $19.73 by the U.S. average total number of head slaughtered annually during these
years results in a product loss of $687 million.  However, these trimmings are not discarded, but
are used for non-human consumption.  For example, as pet food inputs, trimmings received an
average price of $7.88/cwt for the period (USDA, Ag  Marketing Service).  Multiplying 7.53
pounds per head by the U.S. average total number of head slaughtered (1994-95) results in 262
million pounds of extra trimmings with a total "salvage value" of $20 million annually.  Thus,
summing productivity losses ($2,369 million) with annual boxed beef product losses ($687
million) and subtracting the salvage value of trimmings ($20 million) results in a net cost to
society of regulatory compliance with the zero tolerance directive of $3,036 million annually.
The cost of the zero tolerance policy can be compared to the costs of foodborne illnesses
(i.e., the benefits of eradicating illness) caused by pathogenic microorganisms to obtain a measure
of the relative costs and benefits of the zero tolerance directive.  Roberts and Unnevehr reported
the annual cost of foodborne illnesses due to E. coli 0157:H7 and Salmonella as $216-580 million11
and $1,118-1,588 million, respectively.  These include direct costs (medical expenses) and indirect
costs (losses in human productivity).  Estimates of the incidence of these two pathogens in beef
versus pork and poultry were calculated using prevalence estimates reported by the Council for
Agriculture Science and Technology.  For each pathogen, the prevalence numbers for each
species (e.g., percent of beef samples that contain the pathogen) were multiplied by the average
(1993-95) total annual production of the respective species (USDA, Livestock and Poultry
Situation and Outlook) to obtain an estimate of total incidence by species.  The incidence of each
pathogen in beef was then divided by the total incidence for all three species to get an estimate of
the incidence (on a percentage basis) of each pathogen attributable to beef.  Using this procedure,
beef is estimated to be responsible for approximately 52% of all E. coli 0157:H7 related illnesses
and 5.3% of all Salmonella related illnesses.  Although other estimates of the prevalence of E.
coli 0157:H7 are not available for comparison, the prevalence estimate for Salmonella is similar
to that reported by Hensen (table 11, p.16).  Costs to society of foodborne illnesses related to
these two pathogens and beef consumption are $112.32-301.6 million and $59.25-84.16 million,
respectively -- or a total of $171.57-385.76 million. 
It is unreasonable to assume that the zero tolerance directive eliminated all foodborne
illnesses caused by E. coli 0157:H7 and Salmonella in beef.  However, because it is difficult to
quantify the efficacy of the zero tolerance directive, we proceed assuming that the regulation was
100% effective, and recognize that our results overstate this component of the benefits of the zero
tolerance program.  Nonetheless, annual regulatory compliance costs associated with the zero
tolerance directive ($3,036 million) exceed the maximum potential benefits from elimination of
foodborne illness caused by E. coli 0157:H7 and Salmonella in beef ($385.76 million).  Finally, it12
must be noted that these estimates ignore other possible benefits of the enforcement of the zero
tolerance program such as boosts in consumer confidence which may have ameliorated negative
effects on beef demand caused by the 1993 E. coli 0157:H7 outbreak.
Conclusions and Implications
Data from a major meat packing firm were used to estimate a translog cost function and the
impacts of FSIS's zero tolerance directive on the firm's cost structure.  The estimated own-price
elasticity of demand for cattle and Morishima elasticities of substitution indicate that cattle is the
least flexible of five inputs.  Cross-price elasticities of demand and elasticities of substitution
indicate that labor is the most flexible input in the beef processing industry.  An increase in
regulatory compliance costs increases the cost share of cattle, while decreasing the use of all
inputs, including cattle.
These results do not suggest that federal food safety regulations should be eliminated
because our analysis ignores the efficacy of such regulations and potential benefits which may
result from increased consumer confidence with respect to food safety.  However, our analysis
does show that such regulations do have a cost to society.  Thus, the costs and benefits of
regulations should be thoroughly examined before implementation.13
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